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The. BAROMETER .i.A a. .6:tuden.t. n~pa.peJl. 601L the. exc.hange. 06 ide..aA a.nd 
in60Junation c.onc.eJl.ning the. de.ve1.opme.n:t a.nd impILoveme.n:t 06 the. 
plL06e6.6iona.l e.nv-uwYI11Ie.n:t a.:t the. Na.val. PO.6:tgILa.dua.:te. Sc.hooL 
*+*+*+*+*+*+* 
'~he less developed states want to reserve ocean resources to 
themselves, fearing that the more developed states, 'imperialist' 
or 'socialist' alike, will be able to use the traditional free-
doms of the high seas to acquire an unduly great proportion of 
the sea's fish, oil, and minerals. Unless the underdeveloped 
states restrict the freedoms of the high seas, the rich states 
with the most advanced techniques will be able to exploit the 
resources of the oceans most effectively.1I 
Lieutenant Mark W. Janis, USNR, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, March-April 1974 
EDITORIAL COMMENT: LT Mark Janis, an instructor in the Government and Humanities Department 
here at the Postgraduate School, is the BAROMETER's FEATURE author this week. After 
completing his undergraduate studies in international relations at Princeton, he earned his 
Masters degree with Honours in jurisprudence at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar. 
Lieutenant Janis, who had been in private law before coming to NPS in the summer of 1972, 
has spent a great deal of his time specializing in International Law. 
FEATURE: THE SOVIET NAVY AND OCEAN LAW 
"The. Soviet Union, by vWue. 06 heJl. .6bwng na.vy a.nd .i.altge. meJl.c.ha.n:t 6le.et, .i.A one. 06 
the. wolLld'.6 le.a.ding maJU:tUne. pOWeJl..6, a. POWeJl. whO.6 e. be.:t:teIL in:teILe6:t.6 lie. with the. ma.in-
te.na.nc.e. 06 :tIta.di:tiona.l 61Le.e.dom.6 06 the. .6e.a.. In hi.6 c.ompILe.he.n.6ive. .6e.1Lie6 06 o.Jr..:Uc.le6 on 
Soviet na.val. polic.y e.YLtUle.d 'Na.vie6 in Wa.IL a.nd in Pe.a.c.e.', AcJ.rn.iJLa1. 06 the. Fle.et s. G. 
GOlL.6hk.ov touc.he6 upon the. plLoblem 06 how to 1Le.c.onc.ile. thi.6 'C.On.6e1Lvative.' in:teILplLe.:tation 
06 .6 e.a. law with the. 'plLoglLe6.6ive.' e.x:te.n.6ion.6 06 teJl.lLi:tolLial. .6 e.a. 6a.volLe.d by ma.ny de.ve1.oping 
na.:tion.6. Ide.ologic.a1. MetolLic., no.:tw.U.h.6:ta.nding, U lLema.in.6 a.ppalLe.n:t :tha.:t the. RU.6.6ia.n 
polic.y .6te.m.6 Mom helL p0.6ilion a..6 a. le.a.ding maJU:tUne. POWeJl. .u:t:te.e. .6e1Lve.d by a. ILa.dic.al. 
c.hang e. in the. le.gal. -.6:ta.:tu.6 quo. 
Russian naval policy regarding the law of the sea is in an interesting dilemma. The 
Soviet state is a considerable maritime power with a strong navy, a large merchant marine, 
and a very sizab'le fishing fleet. In order to exploit these assets to the full, the 
Russian Navy supports traditional legal freedoms of the high seas, so as to give her ships 
the greatest access to the world's oceans. Such support for traditional laws of the sea 
CIltS the Soviet Union alongside other maritime powers like the United States and the United 
~ingdom, all resisting claims of less developed states to greater national jurisdiction 
in the oceans. But the Soviet Union is unhappy with a C.On.6e1Lvative. label and wants to 
disassociate herself from Western impe.lLia1.i.6:t.6. The Russians seek to demonstrate their 
solidarity with underdeveloped states which attack great power control of the seas. 
Russian naval policy thus attempts to reconcile support for traditional sea law with 
sympathy for the complaints of the underdeveloped states. This reconciliation is, of 
course, difficult and not altogether successful. 
An indication of the problems which Soviet naval ocean policy faces is to be found in 
the concluding number of a series of articles by the commander in chief of the Russian Navy, 
Admiral of the Fleet S. G. Gorshkov. The articles, entitled Na.vie6 in Wa.IL a.nd Pe.a.c.e., 
are published in the Russian Na.val. Vige6t (MolL.6k.oy SbolLnik.) and are an authoritative 
expression of Soviet naval policy meant for Russian naval officers and those others concerned 
with Russian maritime strategy. The final installment of Na.vie6 in Wa.IL a.nd in Pe.a.c.e. 
appeared in the February 1973 issue of the Na.val. Vige6t and was composed of two subsections: 
Some. PlLOble.m.6 06 Ma..6teJting the. WolLld Oc.e.a.n and The. PlLoblem.6 06 a. Mode.lLn Na.vy. The fi rst 
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of these is almost exclusively concerned with law of the sea questions, while the second is 
a general resum~ of all the articles in the series and does not concern us here. Some 
P~obtem~ on Ma4t~ng the Wo~d Oeean has essentially three themes: that the imperialist 
states are responsible for the crisis in ocean law, that traditional freedoms of the high 
seas should be preserved, and that a powerful international regime for the high seas is a 
dangerous proposal. 
Admiral Gorshkov argues that the challenge to traditional freedoms of the high seas 
comes from the imperialist states who seek to divide the resources of the oceans: 
In a.na1.yzing the e-6.6enee on .<.mpeJr..i.a..U..6m, Vta.cUm~ IUeh Lenin paWed ouX that 6..tna.nUa.i 
ea.p.<.ta.t, bung a.n~ 06 tagging beh.<.nd in the 6wUotL6 ~tJw.ggte 60~ the. .6.:t.ift und~dvetoped 
pMt 06 the wo~, .<..6 ~.tJUving to ~uze a4 ma.ny d.<.66~en:t expa.~u 06 the gtobe a4 po~~ibte, 
a4~wn.<.ng tha.t they will ta.t~ beeome a. .6o~ee 06 ~ ma.t~ • .• 
In ~eeen:t deeade-6 in the eJLa. 06 the expto.<.ta.t.<.on 06 the ~Uo~ee-6 06 the Wo~d Oeea.n, 
a.n eveJt inMeMing ~tJLu.ggte hM begun between .<.mpeJr..i.a..U..6t eountMe-6 60~ the d.<.v.<..6ion 06 U 
60~ eeonom..te a.nd m.<.utMy a...tm.6, ~inee U .<..6 beeom.<.ng a.n .<.mme&..a.-te objecUve 06 th~ 
expa.n.6io n. 
One would assume from Gorshkov's analysis that it is the Western .<.mpeJr..i.a..U..6t states 
which have made large claims to national maritime jurisdictions: 
.•. ~eady today a.:t:temp:t.6 Me bung made to tL6~p ind.<.v.ldu.ai. Mea.6 06 U (the Wo~ 
Oeean) by e~n ea.pLta..U...6t ~:ta.te-6 and to d.<.v.Ui.e up .6ph~u 06 ..tn6tuenee ..tn U. Thu6, 
voieu Me being heMd in the u.S. Cong~e-6~ ea.tt.<.ng on Am~ea.n.6 to move to the eMt a.nd 
by 1980 to oeeupy the Atta.ntie Oeean bottom to the M.UJ.-Atta.nt.<.e ~ge, 60~ a.eeo~d.<.ng to 
the a.LLtho~ 06 thue ~ta.temen:t.6, when li .<..6 a. qUe-6wn 06 the oeean bottom, no one men:t.<.o~ 
bo~d~: he Who :ta.k.e-6 .<..6 Jt1.ght. A lUghe.y a.iMm..tng ~ympton .<..6 the p~cUee 06 the exte~ion 
by e~n .6:ta.tu 06 the Umw 06 thw t~o~ ~ea up to 200 m.<.tu, wh.<.eh .<..6 nothing 
oth~ tha.n a.n a.:t:tempt to ~uze g~ea.t expa.n.6u on the oeea.n. 
Thus, Gorshkov bends the facts to demonstrate that Leninist theory explains current 
world ocean problems. Since the imperialist states are forced, in theory, to seize under-
developed areas of the globe, it must be the imperialist states which are mounting the 
attack on the freedoms of the high seas by claiming extensive national slices of the seas. 
But, in fact, the challenge to the traditional freedoms of the high seas is being mounted 
by the underdeveloped nations. The first claim to a 200-mile territorial sea came from 
Chile in 1947 when that state established her p~oteet.<.on a.nd eo~ot ••• ov~ a.tt the ~ea 
ineiuded between the peJL-i.mt~ 60~ed by the eOa4t a.nd a. ma.thema.:t.<.ea.i pMa.itet p~ojeeted 
OuX to .6ea a.t a. d.<.6ta.nee 06 two hun~ed mMine m.<.tu. I n the i r Sant i ago Vec1..a!ta.tion on 
the ~e Zone of 1952, Chile, Ecuador and Per proclaimed: ••• a4 a. p~e.<.pte 06 th~ 
.<.nteJtna.:t.<.ona.i mMli.<.me. poUey that eaeh 06 them po~~u~ ~ote ~oveJteA.gn:ty a.nd jM.<.6d.<.et.<.on 
oveJt the Mea 06 ~ea adja.ee.n:t to the eOa4t 06 w own eou~y and extend.<.ng not tu~ than 
200 rz.a.ut,i.c.a.i m.<.tu Mom the .6a..<.d eOa4t. 
Far from encouraging the 200-mile claims, the Western maritime powers have protested 
vigorously when the claims have been made. When Chile made her original 200-mile claim 
in 1948, the United States responded with a protest note, complaining the p~e.<.ptu 
und~ying the CWea.n Vecl.aJr.a.ti.on •• . a.pPeM to be a.t vM.<.a.nee wlih the geneJta.ity a.eeepted 
p~ne.<.ptu 06 WeJtna.t.<.ana.t taw. The continuing American refusal to accept 200-mile 
claims off the west coast of Latin America is reflected in the conflict between American 
tuna boats and coastal patrols which surfaces regularly in the daily press. Similarly, the 
British Government has resisted greater fishing zones off of Iceland and may only be conced-
ing her case now because of NATO pressure. 
The Western states have contributed to the crisis in ocean law, but not by making 
200-mile claims. The beginning of the challenge to traditional freedoms of the high seas ~ 
came with the Truman Proclamation of 1945, when the United States claimed jurisdiction ove, 
the resources of the Continental Shelf. But the American claim to the shelf was echoed by 
other nations and finally embodied in the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, 
which has been signed by most of the nations, including the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
Union has Its own interest in ocean resources. As Admiral Gorshkov puts it: 
The CPSU pIl.og~ e~ 60~ not only the LLt.<.t.<.za.:t.<.on 06 k.nown n~a.i ~uo~eu, buX 
a.i60 P'Lo~peet.<.ng 60~ new onu. The. WoJti.d Oeean .<..6 M~um.<.ng ~eme .<.mpo~nee ..tn eonne.et.<.an 
wlih th.<.6. The ~tudy 06 li and LLt.<.t.<.za.:t.<.on 06 ~UOMeU .<..6 beeom.<.ng one 06 the g~ea.tut 
.6ta.te p~obtem~ a..<.med a.t ~uppoiling the eeonom.<.e m,[ght 06 the Soviet Union. 
Can the Russian LLt.<.t.<.za.t.<.on 06 ~UOMeU be distinguished from the imperialists' 
~uzMe of raw materials? Yes, if you assume that: •.. the .<.mpeJr..i.a..U..6t ~:ta.tu Me no tongeJt 
~e-6.tJUcUng th~etvu by th~ own iaw.6 on the expto.<.:ta.t.<.on 06 the na.:tuIl.a.i ~ehu 06 the 
eon:t..tnenta.t ~het6: they Me. ~.tJUv.<.ng to extend th~ na..:ti.ona.i jM..t.6d.<.et.<.a~ to the open 
1.OO.t~ On ~ea4 a.nd oe~ toea.ted Va4t d.<.6:ta.neu 6~om thw ~ho~u. But the real challenge 
to traditional legal freedoms of the high seas comes not from the .<.mpeJr..i.a..U..6t; rather, it 
is the voice of the underdeveloped states which is demanding national control over 
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.6e.ah a.nd oce.a.11..6 located Vaht c:U6ta.n.Ce..6 61L0m the)./[. .6holLe..6. As the Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Committee reported at Colombo in 1971: MO.6t dele.gatiol1..6 6e..tt a.ble. to a.cce.pt 
;twelve. mile..6 ah the. blLe.a.dth 0 n the. teJr.JU.;totU.a.f. .6 e.a., while. .6uppoJtUng, in pJUnc1..ple., the. 
tr1.ght 06 a. COahta.i .6ta.te. to c.fiUm e.x.~ive. juJL.iAd.ic;t.Lon ove.tt a.n. a.dja.ce.nt zone. 601L e.conomic 
pltUpO.6e..6. This demand for an economic zone beyond territorial waters was seconded by the 
African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea at Yaounde in 1972: 
The. A6JUca.n. .6ta.te..6 have. e.quaLe.y the. tr1.ght to e..6tabU.6h be.yond the. teJr.JU.;toJUa..t .6e.a. a.n 
e.conomic zone. ove.tt which the.y will. have. a.n. e.x.c..tlL6ive. juJL.iAcUc.tion 601L the. pUlLPO.6e. 06 
contltol lLe.gu1.a.tion a.n.d n.a.tiona..t e.x.ploUa.Uon 06 the. living 1Le..60UlLCe..6 06 the. .6e.a. a.n.d the)./[. 
lLe..6e.1tvation 601L the. PlUmMY bene.6it 06 the.iJt pe.ople..6 a.nd the.iJt lLe..6pe.cilve. e.conomie..6, a.nd 
601L the. pU!LPO.6e. 06 the. ~e.ve.n.tion a.nd contltol 06 pollution. 
The motivation for the Santiago Declaration, the Colombo Declaration, and the Yaounde 
Declaration is the same. The less developed states want to reserve ocean resources to 
themselves, fearing that the more developed states, imp~t or .6oc.ia..ti.6t alike, will 
be able to use the traditional freedoms of the high seas to acquire an unduly great 
proportion of the seals fish, oil, and minerals. Unless the underdeveloped states restrict 
the freedoms of the high seas, the rich states with the most advanced techniques will be 
able to exploit the resources of the oceans most effectively. 
In fact, if not in theory, Gorshkov aligns the Soviet Union with the imp~t.6 and 
not with the underdeveloped world. As the article makes clear, Russian policy is 
COI1..6e.ttva.Uve.. The Soviet Navy is in favor of restricting greater claims to national 
jurisdiction: 
The. ke.y to the. .6olut1..on 06 thi.6 quution i.6 the. .6ruct e..6tabU.6hme.nt 06 limUa.tiOI1..6 
011. the. blLe.a.dth.6 06 teJr.JU.;toJUa..t .6e.a.h, .6inc.e. a. 6uJLthe.lt e.x:te.l1..6ion could c.lte.a.te. the. cia.nge.lt 06 
a.n. a.ctu.a..t cUvi.6ion 06 the. high .6e.ah. Such a. da.n.ge.tt i.6 a..tJte.a.dy taking .6ha.pe. tocia.y, i6 you 
cOl1..6ide.tt .6ue.n.ti6ic. te.chnic.a1. p!l.ogILU.6 a.nd the. mode.ltl1. me.a.11..6 a.nd pJta.cilca..t c.a.pa.bilUie..6 
which .6ta.te..6 ~e..6 e.nily have. at the.iJt c:U6 pO.6 a..t. 8a...6 e.d 011. the. e.x.i.6ting ptta.cilce. a.n.d a. .6 e.l1..6ible. 
unity 06 inte.tte..6t.6 06 the. COahta.i .6ta.te..6 a.nd 06 the. pJUnuple. 06 61Le.e.dom 06 the. hig h 
.6e.a.h, U /.OOuld .6e.e.m completely a.cce.ptable. to limU the. blLe.a.dth 06 the. teJr.JU.;toJUa..t .6e.a. to 
limw 0 n up to 12 mile..6. 
As we have seen, even if some non-Latin American developing countries might endorse a 
maximum of 12-mile territorial seas, they are, generally, unwilling to prohibit the 
extension of an economic zone which would reserve resources to the coastal state. Such 
an economic zone would not only threaten impe.Jtia..ti.6t .6eizUlLe. of raw materials but Russian 
utilization of the same. 
Even the extension of territorial seas to 12 miles poses problems for the Soviet Union. 
Key straits, like Gibraltar, would fall within territorial seas. Accordingly, Gorshkov 
proposes: . •• in tho.6e. .6tJta.W which conne.ct the. open .6e.a.h a.nd Me. lL6e.d 601L inte.ltl1.ation.a.i 
.6 hipping, all. tJta.n..6iling .6 hip.6 (a.n.d in the. wide.lt .6tJta.W a.l.6 0 pa..6.6ing a.iJtc.Jta. 6t ) mlL6t be. 
a.ccolLde.d e.qual 61Le.e.dom 06 tJta.n..6U a.nd o ve.tt6.tight. It is not surprising that, in this 
matter, the interests of the two great naval powers should coincide and that Gorshkovls call 
for e.qu.a..t 61Le.e.dom 06 tJta.I1..6U a.nd ove.lt6.tight through straits is matched by President Nixonls 
preference for nlLe.e. tJta.n..6U th/tough knte.ltl1.a.Uona..t .6tJta.W. The Third World, however, 
does not generally accept the notion of free transit: (From the Colombo Declaration) 
While. all. dele.ga.Uol1..6 we.tte. in a.glLe.e.me.n.t that a. .6tJta.U lL6e.d 601L inte.ltl1.a.Uon.a.i n.a.viga.Uon 
.6hou..td in Ume..6 06 pe.a.ce. 1Le.ma.in 61Le.e. nOlL the. innoce.nt pa..6.6a.ge. on me.ttchant .6hip.6 on all. 
cou.n.tJUe..6, .6ubje.ct to Jtu..te..6 a.n.d lLe.gu..ta.tiOI1..6 on the. Jtipa.Jtia.n .6ta.te..6, ma.n.y dele.ga.Uol1..6 
lLe.je.cte.d both the. "cottJUdOIL 06 high .6e.a.h a.nd '61Le.e. tJta.I1..6U' conce.pt.6." 
For a naval power, innocent passage is less satisfactory than free transit because on an 
innocent passage submarines must surface and no overflights are permitted. Some states, 
including the Soviet Union, maintain that innocent passage by warships is only permitted 
with notice. Thus, once again, the common maritime interests of the United States and 
the Soviet Union find them linked against the less powerful underdeveloped states. 
Gorshkov calls the freedom of the high seas the. ma.in le.ga..t iI1..6t1tUme.nt e.l1..6uJLing the. 
lLe.gu1.a.tion 06 the. mu.tu.a..t lLela.UOI1..6 be.:twe.en .6ove.lteign .6ta.tu wit0.6e. inteJr.e..6t.6 come. into 
con.:ta.ct with one. a.n.othe.lt in the. inte.ltl1.a.Uon.a.i «XLte.M 06 the. Wo/tld Oce.a.n. How does SOy i et 
policy attempt to reconcile this freedom with the demands of the Third World for a new 
international maritime order? First, as seen above, the argument is made that the real 
challenge to maritime order is not a challenge from the underdeveloped states but from the 
impe.Jtia.U.6t states. This argument fails to properly account for the realities of the 
situation. Second, Gorshkov contends that Third World states are mistaken in promoting 
a revision of the law of the sea: 
The.tte. Me. a.l.60 .6ta.te.me.n.t.6 e.ven aga.il1..6t 61Le.e.dom 06 the. high .6e.a.h 011. the. glLound that 
thi.6 pJUnuple. i.6 outmode.d a.n.d i.6 being lL6e.d the. impe.ttia.li.6t.6 to the. de.tJUme.n.t On the. 
inte.lte..6t.6 06 the. de.veloping coun.tJUe..6. OUlL pO.6ilion 011. thi.6 quution i.6 ve.tty c..te.a.tt. 
The. impe.ttia.li.6t.6' viola.Uon 06 the. le.ga..t noltm.6 afte..6t.6 not to the. iI1..6u6Mc1..e.nt e.66e.cilve.-
ne..6.6 06 impe.JU..ai.i.6m wel6, which i.6 .6tJte..6.6e.d in the. de.c.i.6iol1..6 06 the. 24th CPS ConglLe..6.6. 
--
/' , " 
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TheJte.60lte., U iA not the. nO/lIM thCWJ.6elve6 whic..h mlL6t be. c..~ange.d, but 6J.Jr..6t 06 ~ . . 
c..oopeJLa..Uon mlL6t be. ac..hie.ve.d betwe.e.n pe.ac..e.-lovhtg 60ltc..e6 ..(J1 oJtdeJt to 60ltc..e. the. -unpeJt-i.aLiAt 
to .6Wc..iltj 0 b.6 e.Jtve. e.x-iAUng lte.gula.UcJYL.6. 
But existing regulations mean that modern fishing fleets, American, Japanese or 
Russian, can fish within the 200-mile limits which several Third World countries demand. 
Existing regulations mean than any nation can sail its naval fleets within close proximity 
to Third World coasts. Accordingly, many underdeveloped countries are insisting that 
existing regulations be changed. As the Latin American countries declared at Montevideo 
in 1970: The tUght to e6tabllih the Umw 06 the»r. maJU;Wne .6Ove.JtUgYL:ty and jUllMdic...tion 
in ac..c..oltdanc..e w.Uh the...[Jt ge.ogltaphic..al and geologic..al c..haltac..:te.JtiAUc...6 and w.Uh the 6ac..:toJt.6 
gove.JtMng :the e.xiAte.nc..e 06 maJUne. 1te60Ultc..e6 and the. ne.e.d 601t the...[Jt ltaUonal uti.U.zaUon 
(iA a blL6ic.. ptUnuple 06 the Law 06 the Se.a). 
As an alternative to either maintaining the embattled traditional freedoms of the high 
sea or permitting national claims to carve the oceans into national lakes, the United 
States, among others, has proposed the establishment of an international ocean regime. 
The character of the American proposal was outlined in an important Presidential 
announcement in 1970: 
The.Jte60lte, r am today pltOPO.6htg that all na:t..[0YL.6 adopt lL6 .6oon a.6 pO.6.6ible. a ~ea:ty 
unde.Jt whic..h the.y would Ite.nounc..e. all naUonal cl.a.,i.rn.6 ove.Jt the. natuJtai 1te60Ultc..e6 06 the. 
.6e.a be.d be.yond the po..[YL:t whe.Jte. the. fUgh.6elL6 Ite.ac..h a de.pth 06 200 m~e6 (218.8 yaJLd.6), 
and would agltee to lte.gaJtd :the6e Ite6OUltc..e6 lL6 the c..ommon he.Jtliage. 06 mankhtd. The 
~ea:ty .6hould e6tabllih an iYL:te.JtYLa.tionai.. Ite.g..i.me. 601t the e.xploliaUon 06 .6e.a-be.d 1te60Ultc..e..6 
beyond thi.6 UmU. The Ite.g..i.me. .6hould pltov..[cle. 601t the c..oUe.c...tion 06 .6ub.6taYL:t..[al mine.Jtal 
1te60Ultc..e6 to be lL6ed 601t iYL:te.JtYLa.tional c..ommwUty pUltPO.6e6, palLUc..u1.aJr1.y ec..onom..[c.. lL6.6iA:ta.nc..e. 
to de.veloping c..ouYLttUe6. It .6hould al.60 e6:ta.bllih gene.Jtal 1tule6 to plteveYL:t uMelL60nable 
iYL:te.Jt6e.Jtenc.e w.Uh othe.Jt lL6e6 06 the oc..ean, to pltotec..:t the oc..e.an 6ltom poUu.t..[on, to 
lL6.6U1t~ the ..[YL:te.gJtliy 06 the htVe6tmeYL:t nec..e6.6aJLY 601t .6uc.h exploliaUon and to pltov..[cle 601t 
pe.ac..e6ul and c..ompul.60lty .6e:tte.eme.YL:t 06 fupute6. 
The idea of an international regime has generally been endorsed by Third World states. 
For example, it received the support of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Govern-
ment of Non-Aligned Countries in Lusaka in 1970: 
••• an ..[YL:te.JtYLa.tioYLal Iteg..i.me, inc1.u.d.irr.g appltOpJt..[a:te iYL:te.JtYLa.tioYLal mac..hine.Jty to give 
e66e.c..:t to W pltomiAe6 .6hould be. e6tabllihed by an ..[YL:te.JtnaUoYLal ~ea:ty. The Iteg..i.me 
.6hould pltov..[cle 601t the. oJtde.Jtly developmeYL:t and ltaUoYLal managemeYL:t 06 the aJLea and W 
1te60Ultc..e6 and eYL.6U1te the equliable. .6hlling by the iYL:te.JtYLa.tional c..ommuYLliy ht the bene6w 
detUved the.Jte6ltom. It .6hould al.60 make adequate pltoviAioYL.6 to mht..[m..[ze 6fuc..:tua:t..[on 06 
pJt..[c..e6 06 land m..[ne.Jtal.6 and /taw matetUal.6 that may lte6uU 6ltom .6uc..h ac...tivUy. 
But Admiral Gorshkov feels that proposals for an international ocean regime are 
unwise: 
Seve.Jtal develophtg c..ouYLttUe6 aJLe .6te.adily advanc....[ng the idea 06 developing a c..onveYL:t..[on 
on the .6e.abed Ite.g..i.me. and on c..Jte.a.tiYLg an iYL:te.JtM.tional oltgan w.Uh ve.Jty exteYL.6ive POWe.Jt.6 
whic..h would bec..ome, e6.6en:ti..ail..y, a .6upltanaUonal oltgan and would c..o~ol all explo..[:ta..tion 
06 the .6e.abed c..onduc..:ted by di66e.JteYL:t c..ouYLttUe6. It iA quUe ev..[cleYL:t that .6uc..h an appltOac..h 
iA not ve.Jty 1te.aliA:t..[c.., .6htc..e. U ac..:tuatty enviA..i.oYL.6 an ..i.YL.6-tUuilon 06 .6ome .60Jt:t 06 
..[YL:te.ItYLa.uonai.. c..OYL.6olttWm in whic..h htevliably, due to the objec...tive law6 06 the c..apliaU.6:t.6' 
maJLke:t, the laJLge6t ..i.mpeJt-i.aLiAt monopoUe6 would play the majolt Itole. The.Jte60lte, ltegaJLdle6.6 
06 the good ..[YL:teYL:t..[on 06 :the authoJt.6 06 thi.6 ..[clea, the powe.Jt in U would belong to pltewely 
tho.6e 60ltc..e6 agMYL.6t whom the c..Jte.a.uon 06 .6uc..h an oltgan iA ..[YL:tended to pltotec..:t. 
Thus, Soviet naval policy, as reflected in Admiral Gorshkov's article, appears unable 
to satisfactorily resolve the dilemma of supporting the freedoms of the high seas while 
satisfying the demands of the underdeveloped world for a greater share of ocean resources. 
Gorshkov·s argument attempts the reconciliation by pretending that the real challenge to 
the tradi itional law of the sea is being mounted by the ..i.mpeJt-i.aLiAt states. Seemingly, 
the, the Soviet Union can both support the traditional rules and take an anti-imperialist 
stand. But the facts belie the Gorshkov approach because the imperialist states are 
supporting, not attacking, the traditional rules. It is in American interests, as it is 
in Soviet interests, to keep territorial waters narrow and permit free transit through 
straits. In this fashion we both protect the maneuverability of our naval fleets and leave 
the oceans open to our economic use. The challenge to traditional rules of international 
-
sea law comes from the underdeveloped states which, naturally, prefer to protect a share of 
ocean resources through the exercise of sovereignty because they do not have the technologic-
al wherewithal to exploit them in an ocean free-for-all and which stand to gain little 
from greater mobility for great power navies. 
In defending the existing maritime system, the Soviet Union finds itself in a theoreti-
cal predicament. The Russians are now aligned with the ..i.mpetUallit powers, resisting the 
attempt of the Third World to rewrite ocean law in favor of developing states. The United 
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States has moved somewhat over toward the demands of the Third World by offering to trade 
an international regime with control and/or proceeds from ocean exploitation for narrow 
territorial seas and free transit through straits. Fearing that an international regime 
would be in the control of the ~p~~ or, perhaps, because actual control might 
lie with the developing states, the Soviet position, as stated by Gorshkov, is to oppose 
a powerful international ocean regime. Instead, the Soviet Union insists that e~ting 
~egulation6 should be more conscientiously obeyed. But an international regime which would 
donate proceeds to the needs of the developing states is more to the benefit of the Third 
World than an ~p~oved status quo because the underdeveloped states cannot hope to 
effectively compete with the exploiting technology of the developed states. Accordingly, 
the Third World supports either an extension of national jurisdiction or an international 
regime or some combination of the two. Neither alternative is fully acceptable to 
Admiral Gorshkov. 
Ironically, then, Gorshkov finds himself in a more COn6~vative position than the 
United States. While both superpowers favor maximum mobility for their fleets, the 
United States is willing to trade this mobility for an international regime. Gorshkov 
seems unwilling to accept the regime alternative. Despite Soviet protestations and 
furstrations, the Soviet Navy is committed to traditional freedoms of the high seas for 
reasons befitting a maritime power; it is little served by a radical change in the 
status quo. As a consequence, Admiral Gorshkov finds himself opposed to the demands of 
the Third World bloc, no matter how much he doth protest." 
Lieutenant Mark W. Janis, USNR, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, March-Apri 1 1974 
SERVICE NOTES: 
IIUln will. buy two 06 .the Navy'.6 new Sp!l.UaJ1.ce c..eM.6 de.6~oyVL6 60~ Lt.6 g~ow£n.g 6i.eet.. 
The 6ill:t 06 .the 7, BOO-.ton «XtMfvi.P.6, .the USS SPRUANCE, ,u, ne.aJr.ing comple.:Uon a:t Ufton 
IndU.6.tJUe!.J' .6fvi.PYMd.6 .in M-i..6.6,u,.6-i.ppi. 
Britain Trims Defense - British Labor government last week ordered a new cut of $120 
million in the 1974-75 defense budget, ordering defense chiefs to stay within a total of 
$8.66 billion. Treasury Secretary Denis Healey, former Labor defense minister who presided 
over cancellation of the British Aircraft Corp. TSR-2, the General Dynamics F-111K and the 
Hawker Siddeley HS-1154 VTOL fighter, said the $120 million cut would be in addition to a 
$315 million reduction ordered by the previous Conservative government. Effects on 
equipment programs will not be publicly revealed until late spring, when Defense Minister 
Roy Mason details them in the annual defense white paper. The cuts, which are less than 
expected, could center on such programs as the European multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) 
for the Royal Air Force, the Hawker Siddeley Sea Harrier VTOL fighter, and its sea 
vehicle, a small carrier now under development. 
HOU.6e Mmed S~v-i.ce Comm.Lttee ,u, expect.ed .to ~ecommend -i.n.6,u,.tence on a. $2. 1-b-i.f.Uon 
payment. by Nol!;th A:tf.a.n:t-i.e T~ea:ty O~ga.n-i.za:t-i.on a.f.Ue.6 .to 066.6et. U.S. CO.6~ 06 .6:tation-i.ng 
~OOp.6 -i.n EuJLope dM-i.ng F,u,cal 1974 .in a. ~epol!;t .to .the 6ull. HOU.6e .th-U, week. The 
comm.Lttee'.6 objective is to weaken congressional support for massive unilateral withdrawal 
of U.S. troops. Such a. wUhdJtawa1., .in t.wr.n, would und~eut. NATO negotia:to~ .in V-i.enna. 
ma.k-i.ng .6ub.6.ta.rr;Uai. pttog~e.6.6 on a. mu:tu.al a.nd ba.f.a.nced 60~e ~eduetiOn6 (MBFRI a.g~eement. 
wUh W~a,W Pa.ct. na..U0n6. 
The $2.1 billion for the purchase of military equipment in the U.S. o~ o:th~ pa.ymen:t.6 
.to 066.6et. U.S. C.0.6~ -i..6 lLeq~ed und~ leg,u,f.a:t-i.on .6pon6olLed f.a..6.t ljeaJt blj Sen. HeMIj M. 
Ja.ck.6on (O.-WMhl a.nd Sen. Sam Nunn (O.-Ga..I. The aLt~ve ,u, .the wUhdltawai. 06 u.s. 
bLoop.6 pttopol!;t-i.ona:te .to .the 6a...U.wr..e 06 a.f.Ue.6 .to meet. 100% 06 :the U.S. ba.f.a.nce-06-
pa.yme~ de6-i.e-i.:t. Although recommending continuation of the law "at this time", the. 
dM6t. lLepou .6a.-i.d .tha:t .th~e Me "ma.ny pVL6uM-i.ve Mgumen:t.6" nOlL Lt.6 lLepeai.. "Bo.th 
.6en-i.olL Am~ca.n poUcy-ma.kVL6 a.nd lLeptte.6e.n:tative.6 on o.th~ NATO na..UOn6 explLe.6.6ed deep 
conc~n," .the lLepol!;t .6a.-i.d, ".tha:t .the U.S. wou1.d let. det.~.ina:t-i.on6 06 .the ba.f.a.nce-on-
pa.yme~ deM-ill become the dJUv.ing 6a.ct.olL in e.6t.a.bf.-i..6fUng Am~can in:t~na..Uona.f. 
.6 ec.wr1.:ty pO.6t.wr.e." 
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